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The Advance to Argenta and forcing of the Argenta Gap
While the 8 INDIAN DIVISION assault on the SENIO and SANTERNO rivers had been taking place, 56 DIVISION and 2 COMMANDO BRIGADE had been carrying out amphibious operations on the SOUTHERN shores of LAKE COMACCHIO: tank support was provided by 10 HUSSARS.
The object of this attack was to outflank the enemy’s prepared defences on the RIVER RENO
and force the ARGENTA GAP, the keypoint of the whole enemy defences SOUTH of the PO.
On 13 April an order was received from 5 CORPS to send 12 R TKS NORTH of the RENO to reinforce 56 DIVISION, who were by then reaching the enemy’s strongest defences after a very successful advance. This, however, was cancelled in the evening, but the next day the order was again issued and in addition, “C” Squadron were once again to take over of 12 CROCODILES. On 15 Apr 12 R TKS moved over the RENO and contacted 56 DIVISION, who had now reached BASTIA, and had succeeded in overrunning a large part of the heavily mined area covering the SOUTHERN approach to the ARGENTA GAP. Meanwhile 78 DIVISION had been ordered to cross the RENO in the BASTIA area and advance on the LEFT of 56 DIVISION. The ARGENTA GAP at its narrowest point is divided into two by a flooded area; this became the interdivisional boundary, 56 Division being on the RIGHT and 78 DIVISION on the LEFT.
While 10 HUSSARS were supporting 24 GUARD BRIGADE on the RIGHT, 12 R TKS were to support 169 BRIGADE on the LEFT of 56 DIVISION. 167 BRIGADE was in reserve. At first light 16 Apr 2/6 QUEENS and “A” Squadron 12 R TKS were to attack NORTH towards the FOSSA MARINA, the enemy’s main defence line, but this was delayed while 78 DIVISION passed through 2/7 QUEENS in the area of BASTIA. At 0800 hours, however, the attack started but, in spite of being slowed down by mines, by 1200 hours the first objective had been reached: the infantry and tanks were then directed to seize a bridgehead over the MARINA. A reconnaissance was carried out but the ground was found to be very waterlogged and there were numerous mines, it was now impossible to carry out the original plan and the attack was cancelled till the next day.
Meanwhile, two troops of ”C” Squadron (CROCODILES) under Captain G.N. WILLIAMS were put under command of 24 GUARDS BRIGADE on the RIGHT. Their task was to flame the banks of FOSSA MARINA, which the 1 SCOTS GUARDS had reached the previous day. The enemy had proved extremely sensitive to an attempt to cross the MARINA and two attacks had already been beaten off. At 0300 hours the attack began and after a very successful flame attack by a troop of “C” Squadron, 1 SCOTS GUARDS advanced and seized a firm bridgehead on the far side.
On 169 BRIGADE sector it was decided to pass 2/6 QUEENS and “A” Squadron 12 R TKS with one troop “C” Squadron through 11 BRIGADE of 78 DIVISION and then swing RIGHT and take the enemy who had been opposing them in the flank. 2/5 QUEENS and “B” Squadron 12 R TKS were then to pass through and exploit to the double canal of SABBIOSSOLA and BENVIGNANTE. The attack commenced at 1730 hours and the CROCODILES flamed their houses with good results. The infantry and tanks and then advanced against slight opposition and by 1930 hours had reached their initial objective. One tank was hit by an anti-tank gun at extreme range, but was able to come out of action without assistance. “A” Squadron remained in position during the night and on the morning of 18 Apr 2/5 QUEENS and “B” Squadron passed through, but the advance of “B” Squadron was delayed, partly by a broken bridge and partly by a misguided effort by an anonymous officer to divert “B” Squadron off the track into a “TOPF” minefield. At 1430 hours the attack was opened on the bridge over the double canal: opposition was heavy from both flanks, but a flame throwing attack by a CROCODILE of “C” Squadron settled the issue and “B” Squadron poured across the bridge and fanned out on the far side: infantry then moved up. Three Mark IV’s of 29 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION were knocked out in the area of the bridge, one each been claimed by “B” Squadron, Artillery and the Air. An embarrassing feature of the operation was that “B” Squadron took a large number of prisoners in their dash and these had to be looked after until the infantry arrived. Tanks and infantry then
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