Preface

Tank Supply Policy
Under the above heading, Winston Churchill wrote a 6-point memo dated 23rd April 1943. Written as a result of receiving positive reports on "his" tank, it was addressed to Sir Edward Bridges et al.

"The idea of having a spear-point or battering ram of heavily armoured vehicles to break the enemy's front and make a hole through which the lighter vehicles can be pushed has a very high military significance." ¹

Introduction

Much has been written and said critical of the performance of Churchills and Shermans, unfortunately based on actions in which they were not properly deployed. The lessons learned from the actions of Churchill and Sherman equipped units, prior to D-Day in Tunisia and Italy, for some inexplicable reason seem to have been not conveyed to their counterparts committed to action in North-West Europe or, if they were, they were ignored.

Shermans demonstrated in Africa and Italy its potential to be an excellent tank in battle, certainly, the appellations "Ronson Lighter" and "Tommy Cooker" would not have been given to the US built tank if it had been properly deployed. In actions both big and small, for which they were best suited, Shermans did well. As hereafter illustrated they performed magnificently.

In preparing this article, the writer's experience being confined to actions in North Africa and Italy, it was first considered advisable to consult with men who crewed Churchills in NW Europe. Their valuable comments proved to be most helpful. Secondly, an explanation why Churchill equipped units operated as part of an independent brigade, is necessary.

Originally it was the intention to equip all of eleven Army Tank Brigades, based in the UK, with Churchills as they became available. In mid-1942 the number was reduced to six, the 21st, 25th, 31st, 33rd, 34th and the Guards. For a time, 21st, 25th, 31st and 34th formed part of Mixed Divisions, "Army" being dropped. However, when 25th reverted to independent status, prior to leaving the UK, it was once again an Army Tank Brigade. The remaining five, which were not equipped with Churchills, were renamed Armoured Brigades.

Commencing in June 1942, the North Irish Horse engaged in a series of field exercises: Scorpion, Elveden, Limpet, Conquistador, Blazer, Yugo, Yoho, Toc H, Watchful and Autumn, interspersed with several visits to firing ranges. Exercise Limpet was held from 10th to 19th July, at its conclusion, the NIH became virtually independent of Brigade control. The reason, not offic1ally disclosed, tank crews showed they could stay in "action" for longer periods than could infantry personnel - this was dramatically proven and acknowledged by 78th Infantry Division in Tunisia. ² Acceptance that the concept of a "Mixed Division" was unworkable was slow in coming, it was not until the trials and tribulations of the 21st Tank Brigade (the only brigade to see action as part of a Mixed Division, the 4th) in North Africa became known, that the end came to what many considered to be a badly conceived idea. On the plus side, the Exercises working with infantry units proved to be invaluable when the NIH went into action.

Two reasons prompted the reduction in the numbers of Army Tank Brigades. Churchills were not coming off the assembly line quickly enough and, more importantly, the commitment made by President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, made in March 1942, to make Shermans available to Britain. The promise to do so was first done, as happily expressed in a personal most secret cablegram, from Churchill to the Prime Minister of Australia John Curtin, dated 11.7.42. These extracts are relevant:

"It was very fortunate that four months ago......." "....... I obtained from the President 300 of the latest and finest tanks (Shermans) in the American Army. They were taken from the very hands of the American troops who eagerly awaited them, and were sent by special convoy direct to Suez." ³

Lt-Colonel (later by Major-General Sir) David Dawnay, CO of the North Irish Horse, when briefed on the performance of the Churchills of the Calgary Regiment at Dieppe and Kingforce at El Alamein, he "marked, learned and inwardly digested" what he heard - as my old headmaster so often drummed into us. When, as a commander of a regiment that saw action in Tunisia, his suggestions how best to deploy Churchills in Italy were called for, they were listened to and heeded by higher command up as far General (later Sir) Oliver Leese, 8th Army Commander, however, apparently not so by those in command of forthcoming actions in NW Europe. After landing in Normandy, although Churchill equipped Tank Brigades were intended for close cooperation with Infantry Divisions, it was 21 Army Group policy they were better employed working with armoured divisions. The almost blind adherence to this policy meant, only too often, Shermans were fighting in actions better suited to Churchills and vice versa - the men who crewed and died in these tanks certainly deserved better!

A post-war summation from a prestigious Canadian organisation is relevant:

"British doctrine called for tanks used in various roles. The Stuart, a light tank, was used for reconnaissance. Infantry Tanks such as the Churchill, which were relatively slow and heavily armoured, supported the infantry, as well as faster, more lightly-armoured "cruisers" or medium tanks which favoured mobility over power, of which the Sherman was an example. The former were usually grouped into independent army tank brigades while the latter made up the armoured brigades. The Sherman, meanwhile, was designed in keeping with American armoured doctrine, which established that the main purpose of the tank was to disrupt enemy infantry and communications. This doctrine, and the tank it produced, were to prove inadequate for the type of tank-versus-tank combat that occurred in Normandy. Heavy armour and a powerful gun were needed to stand up to the latest German tanks, and the standard Sherman had neither." ⁴

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