Page Two

The "Dawnay Doctrine" in Action

After the battle for Djebel Rmel the Allies, essentially having control of the skies, were able to carry out reconnaissance flights removing much of the guesswork as to how the enemy's defensive forces were deployed. With such knowledge, the decision of which weaponry to employ was easier to reach, nonetheless, however good the intelligence, betimes it became necessary to make quick changes during the course of a battle. When this occurred, orders to reload guns were conveyed to tank commanders by using the "Slidex" code for the day.

The "Slidex" was a simple device which gave some measure of security, from eavesdroppers, to radio traffic between tanks. Changed daily, in addition to the code words for tank parts were some to order a change in weaponry use. Over the air combining two or more code words occasionally could be quite amusing - I recall, after we had lost a track by going over a mine, reporting that "My batman has broken a leg."

The genesis of the concept of preloading 6-pdrs was born when HE became available. Preloading of guns with Armour Piercing ammunition was a must when engaging Armour Protected Weaponry (APW) - tanks, permanently dug-in tanks (Eingebaute Panzeren), detached tank turrets (Pz Kw-Türme) or self-propelled guns. In other situations, the degree of likelihood of enemy APW being on the battlefield determined if High Explosive ammunition should be preloaded.

While later deliveries of Churchills, armed with more powerful weaponry necessitated changes to the Dawnay Doctrine, with Mark IIIs it was as follows.

In defence:
All guns to be preloaded with AP ammunition.
When attacking:
Guns of each Troop's three Churchills, designated by code, to be preloaded when APW is:
        Definitely present - Code 1, all guns AP.
        Possibly present - Code 2, two guns AP, one gun HE.
        Unlikely to be present - Code 3, one gun AP, two guns HE.
        Definitely known not to be present - Code 4, all guns HE.

The Tunisian Campaign

The first occasion that the Regiment was in danger came when it had been rushed south to Le Kef to face an expected attack coming from the direction of Thala. For three days, prior to Rommel's troops moving back through the Kasserine Pass, the area was bombed three times by planes of the Lusftwaffe, fortunately without causing damage or inflicting any casualties. On the evening of the third day, the Regiment's tanks hastened northwards as the Germans had mounted an attack aimed at capturing the town of Beja. Arriving in time, the Churchill Mark IIIs, all guns loaded with AP ammunition, successfully beat off the attack destroying many Panzers in the process.

That the Churchills were able to drive to Beja, on their own tracks at night in appalling weather conditions, so impressed was the Royal Armoured Corps hierachy that a poster for display was in tank units throughout the UK. It was headed "We call this maintenance!" above a picture of a Churchill with a brief account of the night's march below. It is appropriate to here mention that the battle at Hunt's Gap was the only time that the North Irish Horse fought a defensive battle, thereafter the Wehrmacht found itself on the receiving end.

Djebel Rmel

As the Luftwaffe was still active in the skies, an aerial reconnaissance had not been attempted over the Oued Zarga mountains. Consequently, prior to the attack, it was not realised that the Ten Peaks (as later described) had 'hills large enough to swallow up a brigade' and that resupplying tanks could only be done by mules of the 4th Transport Group.

Lacking knowledge if enemy tanks may be present, all tanks went into action on Wednesday, 7th April 1943, loaded with AP - Code 1. On the second day of the battle, although eight Tigers with Panzers Kw IIIs and IVs (presumably the remnants of sPzAbt,501) had been spotted deep down in a valley, as it was obvious that the Germans did not anticipate that any tank would be able to attack the hill top positions, orders were issued to load guns as per Code 4. Three days later, after 'B' Squadron had captured Djebel Rmel, as two Panzers were spotted to the east of the peak. As a precaution, the order to go to Code 2 was issued.

In an operation of just one week, the entire Oued Zarga massif was free of enemy forces, the Dawnay Doctrine had more than proven itself. Although the top Army Brass still had yet to learn that Churchills were tanks which could go where other AFVs could not, fortunately the Wehrmacht, despite the evidence presented on a platter at Dieppe, never did.

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