Page Three

Longstop Hill

Due to splendid work by Spitfires in the skies over the Ten Peaks, spotter planes were able fly freely over the area including the twin-peaks of Longstop Hill. The pilots reported seeing a few Panzers a mile or so to the south but none in the immediate vicinity of the massif itself. Acting upon this knowledge, tanks of 'A' and 'C' Squadrons went into action with guns loaded as per Code 3, later changed to Code 4. (When it came the turn of 'B' Squadron to support 5th Battalion, Royal East Kent Regiment (The Buffs) in the capture of Djebel Rhar, the higher of the two peaks, all 6-pdrs were preloaded with HE - Code 4.) More ominous in nature was the report of many mortar and machine positions being sited on Djebel Tanngoucha, a peak, over 3,000 feet high, with a commanding view of the approaches to Longstop Hill.

78th (Battleaxe) Infantry Division's battle plan was to launch simultaneous attacks, 36th Infantry Brigade on Longstop and the Irish Brigade on the twin peaks of Djebels Ang and Tanngoucha, commencing at 2245 hours, Thursday 22nd April.

36th Brigade's 6th Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment and 5th Battalion Royal East Kent Regiment moved out exactly on time, their objective being the capture Djebel Chaibine. When this hill had been secured, the intention was for the 8th Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders supported by 11th Infantry Brigade's 1st Battalion East Surrey Regiment and the North Irish Horse, to advance swiftly forward to complete the capture of Longstop Hill before dawn.

Bold as the plan was, it failed for three reasons. One, Djebel Chaibine was not cleared of the enemy until 0530 hours. Two, tanks of the North Irish Horse were unable to reach their start line on time, due to running into a heavily mined area in the approach. Three, for two days the attacking troops were under heavy fire from mortars, machine guns and well directed long range shellfire.

It became obvious, unless the isolated twin jagged peaks of Djebel Ang and Djebel Tanngouccha, each over 3,000 feet high, were captured, the assault on Longstop Hill would surely fail. Although no AT or heavy guns were positioned, it was the presence of mortars, machine guns and artillery observation officers on Tanngoucha that the troops attacking the lower of Longstop's twin peaks, Djebel Ahmera, were being subjected to such deadly fire. Although unpleasant, no harm came to the well protected tank crews, the infantry were not so fortunate, their casualties were many.

The task of clearing the enemy from Tanngoucha had been given given to 78th (Battleaxe) Division's Irish Brigade. In planning the attack, while looking up at the jagged precipitous slopes, Brigadier Russell opined that his battalions had to go it alone without tank support. The CO of the North Irish Horse thought otherwise, agreeing to commit a Troop of Churchills even though it seemed to be a task beyond the capabilities of the "Mountain Goats." In two days, the seemingly impossible was achieved, the capture of Longstop Hill was assured.

It was the success of the Irish troops, both infantry and tank, that enabled the door to the Medjerda Valley to be opened. Unfortunately, the small actions that ensured the success of major battles are rarely recognised. Oddly enough, neither the Regiment's War Diary or Battle Report give more than a passing reference to the capture of Tanngoucha. Fortunately others were less reticent as can be seen in The Djebels Ang and Tanngoucha

If any doubt remained in the minds of those in higher places as to the climbing ability of the Churchill, it was removed by the capture of the "Key to Tunis." Perhaps the most important result in the long term, was committing the Regiments of the Army Tank Brigades to fight most of their actions in the comparative safety of the hills and mountains of Italy.

Last Months in Algeria

Following the success of Captain Morrell to mount 75mm guns, salvaged from knocked-out Shermans, it became known that Shermans would be added to the Regiment's inventory until such time as the Churchill Na75s were delivered. Lieutenant-Colonel Dawnay, aware that the arrival of 75mm gunned tanks necessitated changes in the Strategic Plan, before being posted as Second-in-Command of 23rd Armoured Brigade with the rank of Colonel, outlined them at a meeting of tank commanders.

With the delivery of a few "battle weary" Shermans, towards the end of February, came the opportunity to put the amended strategy to test on nearby Gara'et Fzära which had dried out sufficiently to carry the weight of tanks. Also of importance, the intended crews, especially the gunners, were able to familiarise themselves with the American built tanks.

Italy - Fighting in the Appennines and Beyond

As had been anticipated, after Rome had been liberated, the battles in Italy were fought in the hills. While the pattern of preloading guns remained unchanged, there were two changes in the deployment aspect of the Dawnay Doctrine. One, whenever possible Squadrons advanced two Troops up, one of Mark III/IVs and one of Na75s. Two, in more difficult terrain when the advance was limited to one Troop taking the lead, a tank mounting a different calibre gun was added to its complement. The practice of leading with two Troops proved to be effective, especialliy so when attached to 10th Indian Infantry Division during the final month of doing battle in the hills. The practice of adding a tank to a Troop's strength also proved to be of value in several situations. It should be noted, although the Mark IIIs and IVs were called on to fire HE less frequently, they continued to do so until the end of the war.

Italy- Fighting in the Po Valley

A few weeks after the arrival of the Churchill Marks V and VII, the Regiment broke out of the hills to face the problems presented by the Po Valley with its numerous rivers and canals. It was then that the Dawnay Doctrine had its final change, henceforth the 75 and 95 millimetre guns were to be active "stonking" enemy positions, including buildings, prior to attacking them. While engaged in this activity, echelons were kept busy delivering ammunition to the tanks, some of which fired as many as two-hundred rounds in a day.

The practice of increasing Troop strengths to four tanks continued. Sadly, the tank which I first crewed, Bangor (then a Mark V) when attached to 5 Troop, was knocked out killing three of its crew. They and one other, were the last of the North Irish Horse to be killed in action.

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