Introduction

During the brief period that Tank Brigades were part of Infantry (Mixed) Divisions the concept was that its units would be supporting infantry units as follows:
       Tank Brigades - Infantry Divisions
       Tank Regiments - Infantry Brigades
       Tank Squadrons - Infantry Battalions
       Tank Troops - Infantry Companies

The few weeks that 21st Tank Brigade fought in Tunisia, as part of 4th Infantry (Mixed) Division, having proved that the concept was ill-conceived, Tank Brigades henceforth operated as independent units.

The North Irish Horse (senior unit of 25th Tank Brigade) and its component parts suported many infantry units in Tunisa and Italy as the exingences of war required. What follows comes from lessons learned during this experience.

The "Dawnay Doctrine"

Lieutenant Colonel (later Major-General Sir) David Dawnay was, without doubt, the most experienced commander of Infantry Tank Units during his illustrious Military Career. Therefore, it is with some trepidation and may I be forgiven, for having coined the above title in which to describe the techniques, of how best to support ground troops, that he passed down to those who served under him.

His strategic concepts, honed to perfection in battle, were well proven in actions in which Churchill tanks took part. The five basic rules were clearly spelled out and understood by all ranks.

• 1. Never forget the Regiment's role is to assist ground troops in every way possible.
  
• 2. Unless circumstances dictated otherwise, not to go into action without first conducting joint field training.
• 2. Explain straightforwardly to Infantry commanders what the Churchills could do or not do in a given situation.
• 3. All ranks, prior to and during training, to establish a rapport with their Infantry counterparts.
• 4. Never leave an Infantry unit hanging out to dry. Should the circumstances be such that 'A' Echelons are unable to reach tanks, then tanks may move back one (or in small groups) at a time and, when replenished return to enable the next tank/s to do the same.
• 5. If, for exigency reasons, the ground troops are be left alone, their commanders must be fully appraised as to the reasons why,

Tank Deployment.

• 1. Whenever possible, attack the enemy in a location where it is least expected. [In the hills this was not without risk to crews, five tanks fell into wadis etcetera with loss of life]
• 2. Every endeavour must be made to engage enemy tanks within the "killing" range of available weaponry.
• 3. Use the Regiment's available firepower effectively.
      3.1. APW known to be present: 6-pdr gunned Marks to take the van.
      3.2. APW suspected to be present: A mix of 6-pdr, 75mm and 95mm gunned Churchills to take the van
      3.3. APW definitely known not to be present: Marks Na75, V and VII to take the van.

  [The Allies, essentially having control of the skies, were able to carry out reconnaissance flights removing much of the guesswork as to how the enemy's defensive forces were deployed. With such knowledge, the decision of which mix of Churchill Marks best to deploy could be pre-determined, when facing Armour Protected Weaponry (APW), tanks; permanently dug-in tanks (Eingebaute Panzeren); detached tank turrets (Pz Kw-Türme); self-propelled guns.
  Churchills Mark I - Reworked (Tunisia) and Mark Ics (Italy) being only six in number (two per Squadron) had no specific role assigned to them.]

In the following pages, the decision how the weaponry used was reached in several actions is explained.

For information about the weaponry from time to time available to the Regiment's Troops, see North Irish Horse Battle Structure and Tank Inventories.

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