Page Three - Major Morrell's Contribution

The Idea

I was, at that time a Captain in command of a detachment of 665 Tank Troops Workshop R.E.M.E. which had been in support of 21st Tank Brigade during the battle for Tunis. The detachment moved with the brigade back to Bone, where it was attached to 16 Base Workshop R.E.M.E. to assist in tank repairs, purely to keep the unit in employment.

The change from active service in the field, to a static, almost factory like Base workshop was just as frustrating to the detachment as their non-combatant role was to the brigades. A frustration which was hardly relieved by the order in December 1943 to rejoin the parent 665 T.T.W. then under the command of Major C.H.Bevan at Le Khroub some 20 miles west of Constantine.

I became second in command to Major Bevan, and the detachment was reabsorbed into the parent workshop. The unit was engaged in Le Khroub in the ‘reduction to produce’ (scrapping) of large numbers of battle casualty armoured vehicles which were beyond economical repair. These were tha wash up of the North African campaign, and included Churchill’s, Valentines, and large numbers or the various marks of Sherman fitted with 75mm guns.

As the scrapping process proceeded, I noticed that very often, the least damaged part of the scrapped tanks was the main armament, and examination of the armament records, which were in many cases available, showed a useful remaining life of up to 85%.

It seemed ironic, having just left two complete Tank brigades sitting down eating their hearts out for want of a really good tank gun, that I should now be engaged in cutting up dozens of exactly the type of gun they needed.

Was it possible to adapt the Sherman 75mm to the Churchill? And if so would the powers that be, be interested in such an adaptation ?

I was in an unique position to investigate the possibilities – the tank park at Le Khroub contained almost every mark of both Churchill and Sherman tank. After a great deal of measurement and pondering, I became convinced that it was at least physically possible to accommodate the Sherman 75mm in the cast turret of the Mk IV Churchill, and I drafted a letter to Col. Green, DDME North Africa District, outlining the idea.

In fact, that particular letter was never dispatched and the rest of the story, and , incidentally, the creation of the ‘NA 75’ was purely fortuitous.

In the C.O.’s office of 665 TTW, I shared a 6’ square table with Chris Bevan, sitting at opposite sides. On an unexpected visit of the DDME, I gave up my chair and left the office whilst the Colonel talked to Bevan. The draft of the letter was on the table, and the DDME noticed it, and seeing that it was addressed to him, read it. On my return to the office, I was quizzed by the DDME, who was impressed with the possibilities of the adaptation and suggested that the letter should in fact be written and forwarded to him, and he would personally refer the matter to AFHQ.

The Prelude

The letter was written and dispatched, against the counsel of Chris Bevan who was of the opinion that there were too many snags in the proposed conversion to make it a practical proposition, and of other officers in the company whose dictum was that if it were possible to mount a 75mm gun in a Churchill tank – it would have been done before.

A couple of weeks later, things started to happen. John C. Jack, a civilian technical representative of Vauxhall Motors, the manufacturers of the Churchill, arrived at Le Khroub, briefed by the D.M.E. A.F.H.Q. to listen to my ideas, assess their potential, and report back.

This was a fortunate choice of emissary. John Jack and I were old acquaintances, having mat initially in England, and on several occasions during the North Africa campaign. We were both technicians, we had both known the Churchill since it arrived in the service, we had a good rapport, and respected each other’s judgment.

In a very short time John Jack was able to report to D.M.E. that (a) the Churchill turret would physically accommodate the Sherman 75mm, and (b) that the turret ring and mounting of the Churchill was, if anything, stronger than that of the Sherman, and better able to withstand the shock of recoil, and (c) that although the conversion bristled with complications, there was a strong possibility that the 75mm could be fitted into the Churchill, and that it could probably be made to work.

John Jack dispatched a signal to D.M.E. to this effect. 24 hours later a return signal instructed him to return to A.F.H.Q. and to bring me with him. A dawn start the following day got us to Algiers by mid-afternoon, the journey being accomplished in my personal transport-an elderly ‘Liberated’ Hotchkiss coupe which, like the roads we traveled on, had seen better days.

On arrival we were conducted directly to the D.M.E. Major General W.S. (Bill) Tope, who was in overall command of all REME services in the Central Mediterranean theatre of war. The D.M.E. was a blunt, direct, no nonsense engineer, being an old Territorial soldier, and in civilian life, the Chairman of one of Great Britain’s major engine manufacturers.

He was very straight – the idea that a 75mm gun could be fitted to the Churchill, that large numbers of such guns were readily available, and that the conversion could be undertaken with existing workshop services within the theatre, was, quite frankly, too good to be true. He did not suffer fools gladly, and before he wasted either his or any one else’s time on such a project, he would have to be convinced that there was at least an outside chance of the thing being a success. He grilled us both, individually and together until well into the evening. He produced drawings of the Churchill and Sherman turrets, ballistics data on the gun, specifications and technical data on the traverse mechanisms and other ancillaries connected with laying and firing. He went through every step of the proposed conversion, covering the methods I had conceived to counter the obvious snags, and produced snags I had not even thought of. Eventually he closed the meeting, instructing me to report back to his office at 8.00 am the following morning, and not to discuss the matter with anyone in the interim.

After anything but a restful night, I was on the mat again at 8:00 the next day. The General was again very direct, and I remember his words very clearly. “I have decided” he said, “to give you the opportunity to prove that your theories are tenable. You will return to your unit today. I will arrange with R.A.O.C. to release to you a new Churchill Mk IV tank. I will ask your C.O. to allow you to use such workshop facilities and personnel as may be necessary to your purpose, and you will proceed to replace the Churchill 6 pdr. gun with a 75mm taken from a battle casualty Sherman. At this stage, your efforts will be confined to fitting the gun, and making it work properly – all questions of ammunition stowage etc will be held over until the gun and it’s functions have been proved out in the Churchill. The project will be classified as ‘Top Secret’ and will be given the code name “White Hot”

The D.M.E. then closed the interview by saying “Morrell” – I have been looking at your record. You were commissioned from warrant rank less than two years ago. Today, probably because promotion tends to be rapid in a theatre of war, you are a captain and second in command of your unit. If you can make a success of this project, which I warn you is pooh poohed by several of the A.F.V. experts I have referred it to, I will see that you do not lose by it. If, on the other hand, you are unable to make a job of it, and in the process you render unserviceable a tank which cost the British Taxpayer a great deal of money, you can take it that your career has advanced just about as far as it is going to! As a parting shot, he added “don’t waste any time. I think you can do it. Go back to Le Khroub and get on with it, and the best of Luck”.

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